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Nous ne voulons pas en faire trop peu, parce que cela comporte des risques, mais nous ne voulons pas non plus en faire trop, parce que cela comporte aussi des risques. Ce qui se passerait si tout allait mal. Fondateur et editor de la revue The American Interest. Ancieneditor de The National Interest. Given Up in the Iran Negotiations? The logic was clear: Since Iran was claiming to be pursuing an exclusively civilian program, these would have to go.

Yet under the deal Obama is now trying to sell, not one of these is to be dismantled. They will now be fed xenon, zinc, and germanium instead of uranium. Not to worry, says Obama. The inspection promises are a farce. Yet even if violations are found, what then? First, they have to be certified by the IAEA.

Which then reports to the United Nations, where Iran has the right to challenge the charge. Which then has to be considered, argued and adjudicated. Which all would take months — after which there is no guarantee that China and Russia will ratify the finding anyway. It took a decade to weave China, Russia, and the Europeans into the current sanctions infrastructure. None will pull their companies out of a thriving, post-sanctions Iran. As Kissinger and Shultz point out, we will be fought every step of the way, leaving the U.

Obama imagines that this deal will bring Iran in from the cold, tempering its territorial ambitions and ideological radicalism. But this defies logic: With sanctions lifted, its economy booming, and tens of billions injected into its treasury, why would Iran curb rather than expand its relentless drive for regional dominance? An overriding objective of these negotiations, as Obama has said, is to prevent the inevitable proliferation — Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf states — that would occur if Iran went nuclear. Yet the prospective agreement is so clearly a pathway to an Iranian bomb that the Saudis are signaling that the deal itself would impel them to go nuclear.

You set out to prevent proliferation and you trigger it. You set out to prevent an Iranian nuclear capability and you legitimize it. What is the alternative, asks the president? The fatal flaw in the Iran deal Charles Krauthammer. The news from the nuclear talks with Iran was already troubling. It could continue construction of the Arak plutonium reactor.

Bad enough. After which, the mullahs can crank up their nuclear program at will and produce as much enriched uranium as they want. Sanctions lifted. Restrictions gone. Nuclear development legitimized. The agreement thus would provide a predictable path to an Iranian bomb. Indeed, a flourishing path, with trade resumed, oil pumping and foreign investment pouring into a restored economy. Why is Iran building them? Their only purpose is to carry nuclear warheads. Intercontinental missiles are for reaching, well, other continents.

North America, for example. Such an agreement also means the end of nonproliferation. When a rogue state defies the world, continues illegal enrichment and then gets the world to bless an eventual unrestricted industrial-level enrichment program, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is dead. And regional hyperproliferation becomes inevitable as Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others seek shelter in going nuclear themselves. Within months of his swearing-in, he went to Prague to so declare. He then led a party Nuclear Security Summit, one of whose proclaimed achievements was having Canada give up some enriched uranium.

Having disarmed the Canadian threat, Obama turned to Iran. The deal now on offer to the ayatollah would confer legitimacy on the nuclearization of the most rogue of rogue regimes: radically anti-American, deeply jihadist, purveyor of terrorism from Argentina to Bulgaria, puppeteer of a Syrian regime that specializes in dropping barrel bombs on civilians. In fact, the Iranian regime just this week, at the apex of these nuclear talks, staged a spectacular attack on a replica U. Do you want war? Not only does Iran get a clear path to the bomb but it gets sanctions lifted, all pressure removed and international legitimacy.

There is a third choice. Keep the pressure, keep the sanctions. Indeed, increase them. After all, previous sanctions brought Iran to its knees and to the negotiating table in the first place. And that was before the collapse of oil prices, which would now vastly magnify the economic effect of heightened sanctions.

Congress is proposing precisely that. Combined with cheap oil, it could so destabilize the Iranian economy as to threaten the clerical regime. Then offer to renew negotiations for sanctions relief but from a very different starting point — no enrichment. Or, if you like, with a few token centrifuges for face-saving purposes. As for the stick, make it quietly known that the United States will not stand in the way of any threatened nation that takes things into its own hands. We leave the regional threat to the regional powers, say, Israeli bombers overflying Saudi Arabia.

Consider where we began: six U. Security Council resolutions demanding an end to Iranian enrichment. Consider what we are now offering: an interim arrangement ending with a sunset clause that allows the mullahs a robust, industrial-strength, internationally sanctioned nuclear program.

Such a deal makes the Cuba normalization look good and the Ukrainian cease-fires positively brilliant. We are on the cusp of an epic capitulation. History will not be kind. An Innocent Abroad. For all the grand speeches, President Obama has little of substance to show on the foreign policy front. The fact that it is hard to speak coherently about that which turns out to be incoherent may help to account for the fact that virtually no one has offered a full-scale synthesis of the subject.

Shorter sketches on discrete issues there are. Partisan op-ed length potshots and usually mercifully brief blog posts written by the standard assortment of fans, fanatics and fantasists both abound. But, quite uncharacteristically, little big-picture analysis has been published. Doubtless there are several reasons for this unusual state of affairs concerning the affairs of state, but the sheer difficulty of doing the deed has to be one of them.

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Why the difficulty, and what might an answer to that question tell us about the subject itself? They have to do with the interplay of policy rhetoric and behavior, management style and the key factor of personality in presidential as opposed to Westminster forms of democracy. One, which complements the management piece, is the notable fact that there has yet been no significant sudden crisis to condense plans and intentions into procedural precedent—no 3 am telephone call to the White House residential quarters from the National Security Advisor.

The historical record shows that the precedents which matter most, those that elevate some people and privilege certain ideas, are formed from experience, not theory. A second extrinsic concern is a new slipperiness of definition about the subject itself. Foreign policy has always been difficult to disentangle from national security policy. Today, however, both are entwined with the extrusions of a domestic economic crisis that is beginning to look larger and more structurally grounded than was apparent in the tumultuous autumn of Foreign policy looks different to national leaders when seen through the lens of domestic priorities, and this can disorient observers used to a more conventional setup.

The third extrinsic reason is so obvious that most observers neglect it: politics. Barack Obama seeks to be re-elected president in , and his statecraft can not reasonably be understood in isolation from that fact. Let us look at these factors in turn, and then assemble them in hopes of achieving a synthetic analysis. We should not be surprised if our own hard labors at understanding parallel in some ways the difficulties confronting the still new Obama administration that is our subject.

As to the rhetoric of US foreign policy in the Obama era, the one statement that may be offered without fear of contradiction is that there has been plenty of it—much of it presidential in nature. There have been not just one but two start-of-term foundational foreign policy speeches, the purpose of which is to articulate to the world the purpose of American power. Both speeches bore the structure of a standard start-of-term foundational statement in that each stressed five principles or pillars.

We also have as of late May the obligatory annual National Security Strategy, a document that is, accurately or not, taken to bear the imprimatur of an administration at its highest level. We also have, not at all incidentally, the first Obama budget, which speaks volumes in numbers. And what does all this word wrangling tell us? It tells us a good deal less than one might think, not because nothing of substance has been said, but because nearly everything has been said.

But other times he has seemed to be channeling Reinhold Niebuhr, speaking like a moral realist who recognizes the inevitability of trade-offs and the tenacity of the will to have power among people. The sum of it is a profound ambivalence. Beneath the rhetoric, however, there have emerged certain intellectual and policy tendencies, but these have been either unclear or unstable.

For example, in its not very original but understandable desire to be the un-Dubya, the Obama administration broke from the gate offering earnest engagement to nearly every American adversary it could find—Iran, Syria, North Korea, Burma and others. With an apology or two usually to hand, it trusted that more diplomacy and less prominence for the military instruments of foreign policy would unfreeze problems large and small.

At the same time that it privileged an effusive and accommodating tone, its body language was that of cold-blooded tactical realism. All this suggested that, at a time of straitened economic and political circumstances at home, the administration was eager to beat the kind of tactical retreat that would simultaneously reduce US obligations while not letting things go to hell in a hand basket.

This was not an unreasonable approach, particularly with regard to bringing two difficult, expensive and divisive shooting wars to an end. Nevertheless, the policy claimed more than a tactical intent: it pointed inwards to a core source of US troubles. It strongly implied that many gridlocked danger spots around the globe were caused not by genuine conflict of interests or the aggressive designs of others, but by the wayward psychology of American machismo, its preachy holier-than-thou tone, and the temper-escalated misunderstandings that arose there from to make the world more dangerous than it needed to be.

A new tone, the President seemed to think, would make a huge difference; speeches could therefore be, in some cases at least, self-executing vehicles of policy. Certainly, no major problem has fallen to solution just because Obama made a speech about it. Indeed, there is scant evidence that the change in tone the President did manage to bring about has sprouted any positive concrete policy consequences at all. Polls have shown that while the President is on balance more popular abroad than his predecessor, his policies really are not—not in the Middle East, not in Europe, not in Asia.

Thus, candidate Obama swore to close down the Guantanamo prison; but President Obama, finding the problem more complex than he thought once in office, has failed to do so. And he has duly sent forth his lawyers to explain why such killings and attempted killings, even of some self-exiled American citizens like Sheik Anwar al-Awlaqi, do not violate US law.

Before his inauguration many believed, too, that Obama would encourage lustration deep within the Central Intelligence Agency over accusations of its having been involved in torture in secret prisons abroad. He did no such thing, choosing instead to protect the autonomy and morale of CIA operations. It has to follow, whether the President yet realizes it or not, that crossing an inevitably too-inflexible legal line from time to time just goes with that territory.

Thus, in recent months the administration has exaggerated the success of US—Russia relations as an end in itself, when the original purpose of engaging the Russians was to gain aid for alleviating more painful pressures in Iran and Afghanistan. Its misguided blundering into the Israeli—Palestinian cauldron set back the re-commencement of direct Israeli—Palestinian negotiations by a year. To his credit, the President admitted that the problem was more formidable than he had thought.

This was especially true for policy towards an Iranian leadership newly challenged in the streets after its rigged June election. Other efforts, like the outreach to Syria, simply fell flat on their faces for lack of any interest on the other side. The attempt to truly join rhetoric and behavior into a coherent whole foundered further as the level of policy abstraction increased. It had wished to reach an understanding with Moscow on both Afghanistan and Iran without getting snared in neuralgic issues such as the Georgia—Abkhazia—South Ossetia morass.

It thought to use arms control as a kind of lubricant to assuage Russian pride, a notion recommended by the fact that 95 per cent of the work on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START had already been completed during the Bush administration—but this, it insisted, was not a form of linkage. The Russians, for their part, insisted otherwise.

Thus the administration learned one hopes that linkage is a way of life, not a procedural tap one can turn on in one place or off in another at will. Even in areas seemingly of high priority to the administration, it could not reliably connect the rhetoric-to-policy dots. On non-proliferation policy, for example, the administration belabored efforts on its Global Zero initiative, the late April Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the May Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference, even as policy towards Iran and North Korea lay disconnected from these affairs.

It was as if administration principals thought they could move reality by pushing on the shadows it made. We shall see how all this shakes out in due course, but the noises coming out of the Pentagon are inherently believable because they are logical: using force against Iran while the conflict in Afghanistan persists would be the equivalent in American politics of starting a second war.

Yet it seems not to have occurred to administration principals that one cannot effectively raise the prospect of a new form of extended deterrence on one hand while undermining its credibility through a Global Zero initiative on the other. Indeed, the fuzzy indeterminacy that characterizes the Obama foreign policy holds true even at the highest echelon of strategy. Since World War II it has set the normative standards and both formed and guarded the security and economic structures of the world. In that capacity it has provided for a relatively secure and prosperous global commons, a mission nicely convergent with the maturing American self-image as an exceptionalist nation.

To do this, however, the United States has had to maintain a global military presence as a token of its commitment to the mission and as a means of reassurance to those far and wide with a stake in it. This has required a global network of alliances and bases, the cost of which is not small and the maintenance of which, in both diplomatic and other terms, is a full-time job.

Against this definition of strategic mission there have always been those in the United States who have dissented, holding that we do, ask and expect much too much, and get into gratuitous trouble as a result. This is the core conversation Americans have been having about the US global role since at least To the other side has been almost everyone and everything else, so that the offshore approach has always been turned back, at least until now.

Where is the Obama administration in this great debate? If he has a theory of American exceptionalism, it is a far subtler, humbler and more historically contingent one than the secular messianist, attenuated Protestant version that has been common to American history. The President also believes that downward pressure on the defense budget is warranted; his projected budgets show as much, though the prospective cuts are not draconian. But in this he joins a large, politically ecumenical contingent, so his views do not imply opposition to the forward-presence approach to grand strategy.

Perhaps Obama accepts the forward strategy but will end up starving it of resources to the point that it will shockingly fail some crucial test—perhaps the worst outcome of all. Observers can see in it what they have wanted to see. Some have seen a replay of Nixon and Kissinger: Realpolitik hiding behind feel-good talk about allies and peace and the rest, trying simultaneously to play an inherited weak hand and set the stage for a grand bargain—this time with Iran instead of China. Still others think they are witness to the second coming of Franklin Delano Roosevelt: a shrewd opportunist who knows the limits set by domestic constraints, and whose main concern is national economic stabilization and social strengthening against the day when American power must meet a true test of destiny.

The name game can go on because, while no great successes have sprouted forth from the Obama foreign policy, no great debacles have emerged either. There are as many ways to set up the system as there are presidents, but, in general, a president will prefer either formal or informal structures, and either a big or a small tent of key advisers.

The less formal and smaller, the more centered in the White House a policy system is likely to be; the more formal and larger, the less White House-centric a policy system is likely to be. Both models have at times worked well, and both have at times worked poorly; outcomes derive from the quality of the leaders overseeing the structure as much or more than the structure itself.

But structure is not irrelevant. What a large formal system gains in coverage, the use of institutional memory, bureaucratic buy-in, and an enhanced capacity to both plan and implement it may lose in speed, flexibility and creativity. What a smaller, more informal system may gain in speed, flexibility and creativity, even to the point of enabling genuine boldness, it may lose in coverage, cross-issue coherence, bureaucratic support and the ability to implement its own directives. President Obama has chosen the small, White House-centered model, and he has made clear that no matter how pressed he is with domestic policy issues, he and he alone commands his foreign policy system, not he together with his National Security Adviser as in most prior White House-centered systems.

This is as far a cry as one can imagine from what Warren Harding declared after his inauguration in , when he pointed to his secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, and directed all media questions about foreign relations to him. There are two and only two ways to handle the mismatch between a small decision system and an enormous array of decision points: prioritization and delegation.

President Obama has left no doubt what he cares most about. He cares about ridding the United States of its combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan without jeopardizing rock-bottom US security equities in those countries. Now that he has seen the intelligence at a new level and in more detail, he is concerned about terrorism, which leads him to be particularly concerned about Pakistan.

In turn and much related, he cares deeply about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both to rogue states and to terrorists, understanding that either would likely be strategic game-changers. As already noted, he seems to think that the Arab—Israeli conflict, especially the Palestinian dimension of it, is more intrinsically linked to this entire problem set than it actually is, and so he has reasoned that the so-called peace process must be a high priority. In the beginning of the administration, too, Russia held a high priority because, as has already been noted, it was seen as an important tactical ally in dealing with both Iran and Afghanistan.

China mattered as well, of course, but less for its growing geopolitical importance than for its role in the global economy. For most of these priority concerns the President appointed a special envoy who reports directly to him. The envoy in effect for the wars is the Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, to whom he shrewdly delegated the gist of these policy management burdens—shrewdly because Gates, a Republican holdover from the Bush administration, gives him political cover from two directions: he blunts Republican criticism and to a point his presence distances the President symbolically from the wars themselves should things go wrong.

This puts the State Department in an even more minor position than usual, and tips its internal scales away from foreign policy to foreign relations, seemingly a subtle but really a significant difference because in a White House-centered system the State Department cannot act boldly or take major initiatives. This arrangement also delegates by default major aspects of China policy and trade policy to the Treasury and Commerce departments, respectively, and leaves a large dollop of policy towards Mexico with the Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security.

One is that he could place his key political operatives, Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod both now gone on to other jobs , closer to the policy action. Another, however, is concern that the inter-agency process in the Executive Branch does not work well. The special envoy tack comes directly from that study. His decision to appoint her Secretary of State, and her decision to accept the position, were both fraught with unexpressed but well understood political calculation.

Turning Ms Clinton and the State Department into relatively bit players in the policymaking process was not accidental.


The lack of genuine trust in that relationship also explains why the two July foundational speeches were so uncharacteristically uncoordinated with one another. To give but one of many examples, in July the president managed to rile a valuable ally, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, through complete inadvertence. Having unilaterally blessed the expansion of the G-8 into the G in the face of global economic instability, he ordered members of his administration to seek the rebalancing of voting protocols within International Monetary Fund and the World Bank so that they might better reflect contemporary and idealized world power distributions.

As he planned his own Global Zero initiative, too, offices at the National Security Council and State Department were busy continuing their work from the transition on how to reform the UN by reshaping the Security Council. One of their ideas was to create a single European Union seat in place of the two owned by Britain and France.

As is the way of government, each of these initiatives proceeded unaware of what others were doing. And so it happened that, within the course of about a month, three core symbols of what remains of French grandeur were attacked by the US government: the status of France as a nuclear power, the status of France as a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, and the status of France as a major player in international financial affairs. It is the job, in this case, of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to anticipate inadvertencies of this sort, and to stop a runaway policy train before it flies off the trestle.

Phillip Gordon, the current Assistant Secretary, is particularly expert on France and knows Sarkozy; he even translated one of his books into English while working at the Brookings Institution. It was not easy to make the French nostalgic for the days of George W Bush, but the Obama team managed it. This is what comes from trying to run the entire foreign policy of the United States from the White House. Read any serious history of American diplomacy and it becomes readily apparent how central the character of the president is to it.

One of the great mysteries of understanding US foreign policy today in its essence is that, more than any other occupant of the Oval Office, Americans and foreigners alike simply do not have a good feel for who Barack Obama really is. He is black in an obvious physical way but culturally not black in any significant way.

He is a person who, finding himself naturally belonging nowhere, has striven to shape himself into a person who belongs everywhere. As his books suggest, he is a man who has put himself through more reconstructive psychological surgery than any American politician in memory.

A few of the resultant characteristics are critically important for understanding how he serves as both president and commander-in-chief. Obama has understood above all that he must keep his cool. His analytical mien, however, has made it hard for him to bond with foreign heads of state and even with some members of his own staff. His relationship with General Jones, for example, lacked rapport to the point that it seems to be a major reason for Jones resigning his position.

He knows he can read other people without letting them read him. And this is why, in parallel with the complex of his racial identity, he never defers to others psychologically or emotionally, not towards individuals and not, as with the US military, towards any group. That was control at work. But US troops do not feel that Obama has their back. He thinks of them as victims, not warriors, and one does not defer to victims. Whether in law school, on the streets of Chicago, in the US Senate or in the race for the White House, he has commanded respect by being the master orchestrator of the ideas, talents and ambitions of others.

It is the judge who sits above others; they defer to him, not he to them. It is the judge who bids others speak while he holds his peace and shows no telling emotion. It is the judge who settles disputes and orders fair and just resolution. It is the judge whose presumed intelligence trumps all others. This kind of personality archetype can succeed well within American politics. But in the international arena even the American president cannot pull off a judge act and get away with it. Wilson tried and failed or was that a prophet act?

The American president among his international peers is but one of many, perhaps primus inter pares but certainly without a mandate to act like it. As his novelty has worn off, he impresses less and less. One reason President Obama does not impress the foreigners who matter is that he looks to be a figure in political distress at home.

They know, as does the President, that his legacy will be forged in the context of the American domestic moment. Success at home can empower him abroad, but the opposite is not the case. That is why it is impossible to assess the Obama foreign policy bereft of its domestic political context. When Obama entered office, the economy justifiably dominated his time and energy.

Once he gained a moment to sit back and take stock, his attention flowed to what he cares most about: issues of social and economic fairness within America. Thus, even a man who has insisted on monopolizing his own foreign policy saw it ultimately as a holding action against more urgent and important domestic challenges. One does not come newly enthroned to a place like Washington and try first thing to tackle the hardest, most special-interest encrusted issue in town.

That is bound to exhaust more political capital than a novice president can afford. It never grew the legs to burnish his image more broadly, whether at home or, except very briefly, abroad. When the President decided on the stimulus package, when he put together his first budget, when he needed the healthcare and then the financial reform bills drafted, what did he do? Having few ideas of his own, only the remnants of a campaign staff and, most importantly, very few close political allies, he had no choice but to turn to the Democratic leadership in Congress to commute these tasks.

This, to put it mildly, is no way to fight the K-Street transactional culture. Foreign leaders saw this as well, and they saw the widespread if largely unfair charges of leadership forfeit over the BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Clearly, this is only one way that American domestic circumstances cast their shadow on American foreign policy in the age of Obama. As foreign policy has become both inseparable from and subordinate to economic concerns, these concerns play back on foreign policy from several angles.

They bring pressure for a more austere defense budget, which in turn affects key planning judgments with major strategic consequences in the future. They promote concern about trade deficits and distorted international capital flows that directly affect US policy towards China and thus, at least indirectly, towards a dozen or so important allies. The President devoted his yearly General Assembly speech to a political need: rebalancing a perceived lack of commitment to democracy and human rights promotion in US policy.

The Chinese military is building fast; China is asserting its sovereignty in its trans-territorial waters in ways never before seen, all as the capabilities and resources of the US Navy are shrinking. But what takes pride of place in US diplomacy towards China? Trade and money. Is this shortsighted?

French Words Frequency List

Perhaps, perhaps not; it is, in any case, politically unavoidable, for if Obama does not raise the specter of tariffs, the US Congress will. So we are brought to politics. An American administration may be compared to a tea ball within a teapot. The tea ball brings name and flavor to the brew, but without the liquid surroundings and the element of heat to make the whole thing boil, nothing much would happen. Barack Obama is a master of the political arts. To expect such a man to simply set aside that mastery once president is to expect too much.

Its sources are manifold but its consequence is seamless. Some American critics have complained precisely on this point. It is standard practice in Washington to condemn the insertion of political motives into foreign and national security policy decisions. If we now try to put all the foregoing factors together, what do we find assembled? We find a president in a tough spot who most likely does not know if he is inspired more by Wilson or Niebuhr, because reality thus far has not forced him to choose.

We find a man whose inexperience leaves him with an incomplete grasp of what he gives up by asserting such close control over foreign policy from the White House. We see a man whose personality does not function abroad as successfully as it has at home, and so cannot with brilliant speeches alone dissolve the conflicting interests that define the cauldron of international politics into a comforting pot of warm milk. We see a man commanding a decision system untested by crisis, and one whose core issues remain unfocused for all the distractions of other challenges in his path.

We see, lastly but not least, a man whose political instincts are no more detachable from him than his own shadow. From all these sources, bumping against and mixing with one another, comes the foreign policy of Barack Obama. Where the man will lead that policy, or the policy lead the man the rest of us in tow , is now driven by the fact that the President is adrift conceptually since his initial engagement strategies did not succeed. Obama now awaits the crisis that will forge his legacy, but what that crisis will be, and whether the president will meet it with the American national interest or his personal political concerns foremost in mind, no one knows.

No one can possibly know. The reinforcing reasons for this are both remote and proximate, some buried deep within American political culture and others the result of recent and, one hopes, ephemeral distractions. But whatever the reasons may be, four generic phenomena have resulted from the recent abeyance of strategic thought. First, the error quotient of US foreign policy has risen, and even great powers ultimately have limited margins for error. Third, the US reputation for foreign policy constancy and competence has suffered, not least in encouraging revisionist actors to take advantage of the US attention deficit.

And these three phenomena have together stimulated a fourth: a shift by default from the US grand strategy in place since the end of World War II to one absentmindedly bearing a different set of prospective risks and benefits. Unlike classical European and Asian statesmen, American leaders have never developed a tradition of formal grand-strategy making. There is no American version of Clausewitz or Sun Tzu, and comparatively little grand-strategy literature written by native-born intellectuals and leaders exists.

It is also partly because, after the first few decades of American independence and the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, which warned European imperialism away from the New World, the nation no longer found itself locked in strategic competition with proximate near-equals.

Chronique — Kroniek

While this first American grand strategy was simple and hence clear, as all grand strategies worth their salt must be, it was not for the saintly or faint of heart. As Machiavelli put it just past years ago, every benign political order rests on antecedent crimes. The American case is no exception: the barbarous treatment of native Americans, slavery, an early avarice directed toward Canada that led to the War of , and the Mexican War, which even as unsentimental a man as Ulysses S.

Grant condemned as one of the most unjust wars ever inflicted by a stronger power upon a weaker one. Withal, the strategy succeeded and by so doing exhausted itself. At that moment in American history, following the Spanish—American War, several strands came together to produce the second American grand strategy. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great American navalist, fused his grasp of the British strategic tradition with the newly developing academic notion of geopolitics and out came the template for American anti-hegemonism. Long since unworried about a peer competitor in the Western Hemisphere or the return of a European power in strength to the New World, the grand strategy of the United States as a maritime-oriented World Island would be to oppose the emergence of a hegemonic power in either peninsular Europe or East Asia.

It rather flowed from two different principles: First, in a technologically dynamic age, the impossibility that any power at either bracket of Eurasia could amass sufficient resources to literally endanger US security could no longer be taken for granted; and second, no power should be allowed to compel the United States to undertake a level of mobilisation that would undermine the small-government, no-standing-army injunctions of the Founders.

How to implement this strategy? Through self-help and key alliances. Self-help consisted mainly of building up the US Navy to world-class scale; hence President Theodore Roosevelt sent the Great White Fleet around the world in ; the construction of the Panama Canal, completed in , needs also be seen in this light. It consisted in Asia too, many supposed, of US control of the Philippines. Together, this maritime strategy could be aptly termed one of offshore balancing, which fairly describes the British post-Napoleonic Wars grand strategy that inspired Mahan to devise it.

American strategy also depended for its implementation on deft diplomacy to complement growing US wealth and power. A series of linked negotiations involving the United States, Britain, Japan, and France established a new multilateral security balance upon the exit of Germany from the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands, Samoa, and Shantung Province in China — which Japan had seized during the World War but, thanks to American diplomatic efforts, was returned to China in American military weakness, particularly its drawdown in naval power, turned the Philippines from potential strategic asset into real strategic liability in the face of rising Japanese militarism.

First, the pro-democracy ideological dimension of the Cold War, long latent in American thinking about global affairs, merged with the anti-hegemonic objectives of US grand strategy. Second, the mode of its implementation changed from offshore balancing to forward deployment. Whereas in the past, the US Navy, in concert with the British Navy, was the principal military instrument of US grand strategy, after the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the outbreak of war in Korea the main instrument also came to include the US Air Force, now with nuclear weapons, deployed both at home and in bases ringing the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Since US interests in both brackets of Eurasia were relatively impartial compared to those of local powers, and whereas US strength was truly unparalleled, American strategy attracted many local associates. This enabled US diplomacy to assemble a robust but flexible alliance system spanning Europe and Asia. The ideological and economic dimensions of US policy, also attractive to many abroad, became complements to this policy according to the Tocquevillian conviction that prosperous democracies make for better strategic partners.

The US Navy and Air Force thus became, in effect, the ante that allowed Washington to participate in the geopolitics of the two regions, and the alliance structures, in turn, provided a politically supportable means by which US power could combine with that of others. By the advent of the Eisenhower Administration, if not a few years earlier, the grand strategy of the United States was sufficiently clear that a single sentence sufficed to express it: Prevent the emergence of a hegemon over peninsular Europe or East Asia by suppressing security competitions through the forward deployment of US forces, and through a supportive pro-democracy, pro-trade diplomacy.

The strategy did not work perfectly, as the Vietnam War debacle illustrates. Yet despite the tendency of the ideological aspect of the struggle to kick up much obfuscating dust, on a good day most senior American leaders, certainly those in the relevant Executive Branch offices and in the upper ranks of the military, were more or less able to articulate that single sentence. No more. This is not a partisan issue. Both American liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, each in their own ways, have long been bridled to Whig views of history.

Both were disciplined from indulging in excessive secular messianism during the Cold War by the realism-inducing spectre of clear and present dangers. The Clinton Administration acted as though the great wave of post—Cold War globalisation represented a cosmic confluence of American power, interests, and values all wonderfully woven together.

In consequence, funding for the military and foreign assistance plummeted. The Bush 43 Administration held a similar view, except that the now obviously underestimated scale of the aforementioned atavistic reactions evoked a more muscular and ambitious promotion of presumed universal best practice. Had American leaders recognised and affirmed what US grand strategy actually was, launching and mis fighting two land wars in Asia Minor would have been the last things they would have chosen to do.

But no replacement stood in its place as the economic crisis descended. With that shock there soon came a new American administration preoccupied with domestic problems and even more prone than its post-Cold War predecessors to think in legal-moral categories rather than in strategic ones. These tendencies are illustrated in the Syria and Iran policy portfolios, where a focus on non-proliferation issues has related to second tier the larger strategic stakes raised by the cases seen separately, and especially seen together.

Insofar as there is any larger thinking about strategy in the current administration, perhaps a coherent view actually does exist despite the appearance of ad hocery. That view, an optimistic or benign realism, is said to posit that the United States can withdraw from virtually all European and most Middle Eastern issues without risk because a more or less friendly post-American balance of power is latent in the structure of international affairs and will bloom forth if only America gets out of the way and lets it do so.

Such a view, identified with a neo-offshore balancing perspective, certainly exists in academic circles. Whether this view is truly characteristic of high-level Obama Administration thinking is difficult to know. The signs are ambiguous. In that case, the rollout reflected less a substantive or doctrinal adjustment and more a joint attempt by two beleaguered services to advance their claims to larger defence budget shares. Perhaps a switch from a forward-deployment method of preventing hostile hegemons in favour of an offshore-balancing one is wise.

Perhaps the United States cannot afford the post—World War strategy for political reasons; perhaps, too, it runs more risks than vital US interests warrant in a post—Cold War environment. Certainly it is irresponsible to maintain commitments without willing the means to redeem them en extremis — that is the sort of derangement of ends and means that birthed the Pacific War. Perhaps the anti-hegemonic state-based objective itself is outdated, and that the threat of apocalyptical terrorism joined to weapons of mass destruction is now the principle problem to be addressed.

One would think that, under the circumstances, Americans among themselves and with allies would be discussing these issues. After all, differing means of executing an anti-hegemonic strategy demand different mixes of military-technical, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other skill sets.

Each requires different kinds of alliances and asks different things of allies. Some regions seem more amenable to stable do-it-yourself local balances than others; but which are which? The potentially destabilising consequences of transitioning from one posture to the other, too, need to be thought through. Unfortunately, little in the way of a strategic debate is discernible in Washington, either within the administration at high levels or among the political class at large.

There is still little recognition here in Washington even of what US grand strategy has been for nearly the past seventy years, hence no basis from which to discuss alternatives. Instead, US thinking, if one can call it that, is being driven by financial strictures, some of them, like sequestration, self-inflicted beyond necessity or logic. In short, the United States is sliding toward an offshore-balancing grand strategy by default, without discussing its implications and without even calling it by its proper name.

A nation does not have a grand strategy if those responsible for devising and implementing it cannot articulate what it is. American grand strategy thus seems to have suffered a strange, silent death. One wishes to say rest in peace, as with any saddening death, but that wish may very well go unrequited. Although relatively few Americans have noticed the problem, senior figures among several allies and associates have.

American commitments to allies have nowhere been formally rescinded, but the credibility of those commitments is now everywhere doubted. Star-spangled anger It was the day religion and politics collided. Ten years on, what has America done to itself? As with the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the assassination of President Kennedy, all adult Americans know where they were on September 11, The Washington Monument was in its usual place outside my south-west-facing office window as were, of course, the streets below.

Once it had become clear that an attack was in progress, national and local media assumed a slightly manic tone. Most private offices reacted by letting their staff go, resulting in gridlocked mayhem throughout the city. Just as, Eleanor Roosevelt once observed, no one can make a person feel inferior without his or her consent, no one can terrorise you unless you co-operate.

Of course we would use the phone to assure relatives and friends that we were safe and we would monitor the news; if necessary, we would adjust to further events. We all stayed until past 5pm, emerging later for the evening commute into a virtual ghost town. In the past decade, I have often thought of those first few hours after the attacks, and I have come to realise the basic error that US leaders made was to inadvertently co-operate with an enemy too weak to achieve its ends in any other way. I thought that, whatever our private worries about the future, the public face of American leadership should radiate optimism and courage, not anger or fear.

Of course, we needed to prevent follow-on attacks. That, it seemed clear to me, meant urgently removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that had sheltered and abetted the September 11 plotters. We also eventually needed to take out, in one way or another, those who might be planning more attacks, wherever they might be. The Bush doctrine version 1. Nor did I object to President Bush terming the situation a war, for that was necessary to tell people what was at stake, to break with the failed policies of the past, and to make available certain prudent presidential legal authorities.

Still, despite the need to act, I was sure we should not take ourselves psychological hostage, as the Carter administration had allowed to occur after the US Embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian fanatics in November We should not allow the attacks to define or monopolize US foreign policy as a whole. Alas, that is precisely what the administration did allow. The only senior US leader who seemed to take the approach I thought best was Colin Powell, whose influence had been marginalised in the administration.

He did not believe that the terrorist threat was of an existential nature that required the cashiering of American strategic principles, allies or institutions. But other administration principals thought differently, quickly accepting a theory-in-waiting, widely ascribed to so-called neo-conservatives, of why September 11 had happened: a democracy deficit in the Arab-Muslim world had forced frustrated citizens into the mosque, where they had been easy prey for religious charlatans and demagogues.

The answer was to open up space for dissent, democratic debate and the social balm supposedly provided by market economics. Then these stultified societies could breathe and develop normally, and would not produce demonic mass murderers like Osama bin Laden. Thus did fear boomerang, in the way that human emotions predictably do, to encourage a form of hubris fed from the wells of post-Cold War triumph and triumphalism.

The September 11 attacks had the effect of propelling US policy to do more at a time when its capacity to influence events had diminished thanks to the end of Cold War bipolarity and the diffusion of lethal technologies to weak state and non-state actors. It propelled the US to ramp up its metabolism and inflate its definition of vital interests rather than calmly discern distinctions among them.

Unrivalled US power, pre-eminently of the military kind, would end the threat by transforming the political cultures of more than two dozen Arab and Muslim-majority countries into liberal democracies. This solution in turn depended on the validity of what was known as democratic peace theory—that democracies do not make war on other democracies—and on cherished Tocquevillian views of the pacific nature of egalitarian democratic societies.

Contrary to what many claim, this theory of the sources of September 11 existed within the administration well before the Iraq war began. The theory emerged into public view when, in February , Bush gave a major speech at the American Enterprise Institute in which all the basic themes of this view found expression. That constituted the Bush doctrine version 3. The rush to closure over a fearful shock to US security interests, and the hubristic response to it, was part of a longstanding pattern in American foreign policy history.

Self-avowed neo-conservatives composed a group that was always smaller, more internally diverse and less influential than is often supposed. Rather, neo-cons struck chords very familiar to American history and political culture, chords that even national interest conservatives like Vice- President Cheney and Defence Secretary Rumsfeld could harmonise with. Had there been no neo-cons, the pattern would have asserted itself anyway in some other ideological dialect. The pattern of which I speak, conceived by the historian Walter A. McDougall, consists of four phases that tend to repeat in cycles.

First, there is a shock to the system, usually in the form of a surprise attack: the shot fired at Fort Sumter in April , the sinking of the Maine in Havana Harbour in , the sinking of the Lusitania in , Pearl Harbour in , and September 11 in Bush—vows to resurrect the status quo ante and punish the evildoers. But third, in the course of mobilising the national effort to achieve the limited goals set after the shock, the transcendent God-talk begins and the effort soon becomes enmeshed in the sacred narrative of American exceptionalism.

This leads to a distension of goals and expectations, to geopolitical amnesia, and to what cognitive psychologists call a dominant strategy that is impervious to negative feedback and logical contradiction. So, too, did we turn what could and should have remained a punitive military operation in Afghanistan into a quixotic, distracted, underfunded nation- and state-building campaign.

And so, too, did we conflate all our adversaries into one monolithic demon—typical of eschatological thinking. Then, in the fourth phase, overreach leads to setbacks the Korean War, for example, and the Iraq insurgency and regrets like the Vietnam War , ultimately resulting in at least temporary retrenchment … until the cycle starts all over again. This four-phase model fits the September 11 decade to a tee. The attack itself is of course phase 1; the Bush doctrine version 1.

It matters in all this, however, whether the ideological vehicle that propels phase 3 forward even remotely reflects or aligns with reality. When it does, as it did during and after World War II, no one pays attention since things tend then to turn out well. In the case of the September 11 decade, unfortunately, it did not. There have been basically two problems with it. Second, even if it were not mistaken, the timetables in which democracy promotion was seen as a solution for mass-casualty terrorism do not even begin to match.

It rushed into premature elections in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, with troublesome and still open-ended consequences for Iraq and disastrous ones for Lebanon and Gaza. After September 11, as Americans searched for analogies that might help them understand the motivations for the attacks, most found themselves with very shallow reservoirs of historical analogies. Indeed, Americans tended almost exclusively to choose Cold War metaphors to explain September Liberal idealists took their characteristic meliorist approach: It was poverty and injustice that motivated the attacks, and American policies that determined the target.

Conservative idealists, as already noted, took the democracy-promotion approach, arguing that the motivation was not economic but political. But the obvious weaknesses of the meliorist approach encouraged conservative idealists in their conviction that their own view, therefore, must be right. Manichean-minded Americans have real problems when any potential set of choices exceeds two. The President also seemed to be saying, in a locution repeated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Cairo in June and many times thereafter, that US Cold War policy in the region was unsuccessful on its own terms, that it did not provide safety and stability.

These claims are nonsensical by any realistic measure. The record was not perfect, of course, and we certainly should have rethought old habits sooner than we did after the Berlin Wall fell; but it was good enough, as we say, for government work. Certainly, too, it was never in the power of the US government to bring about democracy in the Arab world during the Cold War. The result was almost breathtakingly counterproductive. Rapid economic growth and rapid democratisation, even had they been possible, would not have stabilised Arab societies and made them less likely to spark off political violence against the West; it would have made such violence more likely.

When the Bush administration campaigned to spread democracy to the Arabs, it never occurred to most of its principals that what they saw as a secular endeavour would be interpreted in the Muslim world through a religious prism, and used accordingly in intra-Islamic civilisational disputes. As it happens, the locals were essentially correct. Our longing to spread it to the Muslims is the 21st-century version of what was, in the 19th century, a much more honest and self-aware missionary movement.

Looking at US behaviour in the September 11 decade as a manifestation of a secularised political theology explains far more than the standard parsing of the usual-suspects schools of thought: conservative and liberal realists and idealists, Jacksonians and Hamiltonians and all that. They were not engaged or debated but shunned or excoriated. Had it still been in style, they would probably have been burned as witches.

The American penchant for seeing the world, especially the world of foreign and national security policy, in transcendental terms, is not an historical constant. It tends to rise in phase 3 of the cycle, when the God-talk emerges out of post-shock mobilisation. But there is a concurrent trend of more recent vintage that may have made things more acute during the September 11 decade. Over the past half century, America has become increasingly deculturated. As Robert Putnam put it in his Bowling Alone argument, we have suffered a deep erosion of social capital.

The implications of de-acculturation for American politics are are manifest. The decline of social trust abets both the polarisation of politics and popular cynicism toward government. It produces a political system in which the chain of connective institutions that link family to neighbourhood to larger community to town or region and ultimately to the national level gets broken, rendering the state both alien and intrusive at the same time as it tries to compensate for a social fabric now rent and tattered.

Political parties, particularly those that tend to represent class or ideological structures, flow into the spaces once occupied by a diverse array of social interaction. Identity groups disguised as political parties do not play well together. The implications of all this for foreign policy are obvious.

Presidential judgments necessarily become politicised, and opponents invariably try to criminalise them. Every decision becomes part of the catechism to the loyal, an act of moral enormity to the opposition. That is why the acrid debates over Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, waterboarding and warrantless wiretaps, the Patriot Act and the reach of wartime executive authority, took on the tones they did. These arguments did not remind one of the civilities of the common law tradition; they sounded more like transcripts from the Spanish Inquisition.

The great sociologist E. Digby Baltzell, the man who coined the term WASP back in the s, once said to me that the greatest tragedy of 20th-century America is that the formidable energies of religion had migrated into politics, to the detriment of both. No wiser comment has ever been made about the trajectory of American politics this past half century, and here lies, I think, the key insight for those trying to comprehend the American September 11 decade at its very core.

The decade has not been about what others have done to America; it has been about what Americans have done to themselves. He is founding editor of The American Interest. Will it work? Colin Hardie, p. Balsdon, p. Balsdon, concerne la vie quotidienne p. Que penser de ce volume? On ne peut dire qu'il soit mauvais, au contraire.

Pourtant, il ne satisfait pas toujours. La plupart des chapitres, enfin, sont pourvus d'une bibliographie. Et le nom de M. Maguin- ness Londres, George Allen et Unwin, ; p. Coleccion Historia y Pensa- miento, t. Epigraphische Studien 1, Beih. Prijs : 28 DM. Epigraphische Studien 3, Beih. Prijs : 27 DM. Deel 1 bevat inscripties met gegevens over troepenbewegingen en sterkte in het Imperium Romanum.

Afgezien van de artikels van R. Cagnat en A. Neumann in de grote franse en duitse encyclopedische werken, is de literatuur terzake beperkt. Voor discussie vatbaar is de door de auteur gevolgde methode die er in bestaat alleen inscripties op te nemen die ondubbelzinnig de vexillatio vermelden terwijl dit standpunt niet integraal houdbaar bleek. Wat met de indirecte indicaties b. Zo kwamen toch problematische opschriften in deze studie terecht — wat het verdere wetenschappelijk onderzoek kan stimuleren — aldus de auteur.

Rangschikking der inscripties gebeurt per keizer en in chronologische volgorde. In een eerste gedeelte worden de operationele detachementen belicht, in een tweede gedeelte' p. Hier wordt een indeling per provincie gevolgd. Door de talrijke referenties en verklaringen is deze uitgave veel meer geworden dan een inventaris.

Het is een ernstige bijdrage tot de kennis van de militaire geschiedenis van het Romeins Imperium. Dat nog met vele vraagtekens b. Deel 3 inventariseert en commentarieert inscripties met informatie over de Romeinse legati. Meer nog dan in deel 1 wordt een lacune aangevuld. Vergeten we niet te vermelden dat beide hier besproken uitgaven verrijkt werden met overzichtelijke tabellen, indices en bibliografische gegevens.

Kortom, het terrein van de epigrafie werd hier zeer rijkelijk benut en uitgebreid. De Rijck. Alcock, dans J. Steer , chronologie des limites de terre et de pierre de la Dobroudja p. Florescu , , T. Prix : 6,80 DM. Rose, Griechische Mythologie. Prix : 19,80 DM. Cumont et de H. Le livre de R. Brill, ; xrv p. Vermaseren, la publication de Ladislaus Vidmann, Sylloge inscriptionum religionis isiacae et sarapiacae, W.

Martin Classical Lectures, vol. Deux rapports philosophiques ont suivi cette partie scientifique. Schmiedt et R. Chevallier mur grec du ives. Prix : 25 florins , part d'une constatation. Brooke et N. Me Lean pour le Pentateuque Cambridge, , celle de J. Nestle Stuttgart, Pour mon-. Il faut remercier l'auteur de cet ouvrage, qui pourrait ouvrir de nouvelles perspectives dans un domaine toujours difficile. Patristic Studies, vol. II, p. Ill, p. IV, p. VI, p. Le chap. Paul et S.

VIII, p. Nous reviendrons quelque peu sur ce chapitre. XI, p. XII, p. Or, W. Dumont Schauberg, ; p. L'historique des collections vaticanes accueille le lecteur au seuil de ce livre. II, Scienze Storiche, 11, ; p. Chiara Formis publie deux canthares falisques de la collection R. La contribution de Maria Pia Rossignani, Saggto sui restauri setteceniescki ai dipinti di Ercolano e Pompei, comporte quelque p.

Par ailleurs, on corrigera, pi. VII, fig. Si les plus anciens exemplaires sont sans doute d'origine orientale Egypte? Les autres articles de ce premier volume concernent le Haut Moyen Age. Boselli et par R. Prix : 42s. Martin's, Londres, Methuen, ; un vol. Paris, Albin Michel, ; un vol. Ainsi M. Studies, Vol. Prix : 35 couronnes. Jean Deshayes, A propos du Minoen ancien, dans le B. VIII Prix : 15 couronnes. XXIV, Prix : 60 couronnes.

Enfin M. Mervyn R. Prix : 30 couronnes. En , M. Oscar Broneer Hesperia, 35, , pp. VII , M. George E. La Ceramica, Rome, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, ; un vol. Collection Incunabula Graeca, vol. Prix : 3. Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology, vol. Prix : 15 couronnes. Des forteresses apparaissent.

Un grave tremblement de terre marqua le second quart du xie s. L'ensablement des ports explique aussi l'abandon de certains sites. Le syllabaire chypriote transcrit au vne s. A partir de la fin du vie s. Avec la civilisation du bronze ancien de Philia se fait sentir une influence anatolienne. Les tombes sont des puits ovales ou des grottes. A la fin du xme s.

Kition, recouverte par Larnaca, abritait comme Enkomi ses tombes dans la cour des maisons. A partir du xie s. Vers le milieu du vie s. De la Chypre romaine 58 a. C'est probablement un des meilleurs ouvrages de cette belle collection. Prix : 2,50 dollars. Sdka, vol. Pour sa part, M. Sima, vl. Petsas a bien voulu en faire dans Ch. Delvoye et G. Storia universale dell'arte, II, 1. Rien n'est plus difficile non plus. Signalons seulement quelques points. On ne doit plus parler des reliefs thasiens du Louvre p.

Phidias, comme on s'y attendait, a une place de choix. Mussche, L'architecture grecque, Fasc. Monumenta Graeca et Romana, vol. II Leyde, E. Brill, ; p. Les reproductions que comporte l'ouvrage de H. La sculpture. Picard, ; un vol. On y a recueilli de la vaisselle de marbre. Untersuchugen zur Darstellung der bewaffneten Athena in archaischer Zeit. Waldsassen, Stiftland-Verlag, ; un vol.

Prix : 7,80 DM. Ce changement s'explique pour M. Kleiner comme pour J. Prix : 25 livres anglaises. Un ouvrage de R. Leyde, E. Il s'agit donc d'une ensemble contemporain. Tomba del Cacciatore : fin du vie s. Tomba del Triclino : ;. Tomba dei Leopardi : ;. Tomba dei Fiorellini : milieu du Ve s. Ce travail est fort complet. En guise d'introduction, A. Susini s'attache aux divers aspects de la domination romaine du territoire et de la ville. Veggiani les pages qui les concernent.

Giovanni in Galilea. Dans l'autre appendice, G. Retenons que sur Sous les Celtes, seule survit Adria. Altinum est importante. Ravenne seule survit. Dans la partie basse, P. Vers la fin du ne s. Jusqu'au milieu du ine s. Les pages que M. Poulin-Josien, MM. Darolles, C. Jacquiot, M. C Gazan, M. Le travail de M. Cela en rend le maniement bien difficile. Mais ces remarques. Il est bien plus simple, et plus exact, d'indiquer : A. Souhaitons toutefois que lorsque M.

Duculot, coll. Le texte de Ch. Prix : 25s. Jessup a parfaitement atteint son but. Rivet, Londres, Routledge and Kegan Paul, , xvi p. Frederick Wainwright. Bowen, The Celtic Background, p. Smith The Mosaic Pavements, p. Webster, The Future of Villa Studies, p. MUe L. MUe C. Wegner, Die Musensarkophage, Berlin, L'Orange sur la date des divers types, opinion remise en cause par A. Balty y voit Clodius Albinus et A. McCann ne le retient pas. Cet excellent travail, dont on louera la rigueur scientifique, rendra les plus grands services.

Comme sept couches avec t. Son origine, que l'auteur place vers 40 avant J. C'est l'un des buts que se propose G. Die reliefverzierte Terra Sigillata Limesforschungen, vol. Mann, ; p. Tongres, 96 p. Brown, Catalogue of Italian terra-sigillata in the Ashmolean Museum. Evans et de J. Beazley, et par l'achat de la collection Lloyd. Perennius Tigranus. Les officines de Rasinius, de C. Tellius, de L. Pomponius Pisanus, de P. Dragendorff et C. Laing, Gallo-roman pottery from Southampton and the distribution of terra nigra in Great Britain. Il est connu, et l'auteur ne doit pas l'ignorer, que les erreurs de lecture sont nombreuses et qu'il faut faire attention aux ortographes reprises dans cet ouvrage.

Deneauve, Lampes romaines de Carthage Paris, C. Du Ier s. Entre autres, M. Milt- ner pour ses catalogues des lampes du Klagenfurter Landesmuseum et d'Eisenstadt J. Or, dans le premier de ces catalogues, Miltner indique qu'il emploie, sans la modifier, la typologie de Loeschcke. Signalons enfin, outre une importante bibliographie, des tableaux et dessins remarquablement clairs, ainsi que de bonnes planches photographiques.

Earle R. The Corning Museum of Glass Monographs, vol. Le dernier chapitre,. Cultura, ; un vol. LXVI pi. Kraay p. Il est assez curieux de constater cependant que l'atelier II, inofficiel, utilisa des types de revers qui nous sont inconnus pour les frappes de l'atelier de Cologne. On dira que ce ne sont que peu de grammes. A la fin de chaque chapitre M. Prix : fr. Comme le disait M. Bons index et bonnes indications des sources, notamment des revues. Moreau et S. Sans doute l'ouvrage de A. Elle fournit ainsi un reflet assez exact des publications luxembourgeoises, dans tous les domaines.

Cromwell bewijst in The losing of the initiative by the House of Commons p. Namier en zijn school het aantoonden, doch dat dit na verandert. De overmacht der regering is vooral het gevolg van de groei van de nationale partijen konservatieven en liberalen in de jaren De verdeling der groepen in het Long Parliament in presbyterianen en independents is al te simplistisch. Men kan in elk geval de parlementairen klasseren in gematigden en radikalen, een indeling die in de jaren door tijdgenoten zelfgemaakt werd. In feite zijn er meer facties.

John, Samuel Browne, John Crewe e. Een enkele is Independent op reli-. Ze sympathiseren lang niet alle met sociaal radikalisme. Wel zijn ze allen constitutionele monarchisten en anti-Schots. De middeleeuwse religieuze geschiedenis is aan de beurt met twee bijdragen. Vooral de Cluniacenser-paus Urbanus II speelde een grote rol in deze ommezwaai. Oorspronkelijk was de invloed van de Imitatio gering, althans tot de eerste Engelse vertaling gedrukt werd in ; voordien circuleerden slechts enkele handschriften van de Engelse versie.

Wel was daarnaast de latijnse tekst in Engeland bekend, nadat het originele werk tussen en afgesloten werd. In de 2 e helft der 15 e eeuw hebben vele Engelsen, o. Edward IV, Vlaamse scribenten gepatroneerd. Dit alles wijst op vrij intensief kultureel kontakt tussen Engeland en de Lage Landen. Lewis p. De vernietiging van het Kalifaat en de Islam-beschaving in de 13e eeuw werd evenwel overschat, vermits de Islam-beschaving toen reeds in verval verkeerde.

De Mongoolse verovering bracht o. Op het terrein der rechtsgeschiedenis en instellingen worden The Common Lawyers in Prereformation England bestudeerd door E. Ives p. Francis Bacon noteerde, i. De groep der juristen bezitten een dergelijk prestige dat de kroon systematisch op hen beroep deed voor administratieve functies : zeven van de tien kanseliers van het hertogdom Lancaster waren legisten tussen en , alle de 22 speakers van het Lagerhuis tussen en waren common lawyers. Het legisten-milieu leidde tot welstand, versterkt door een massief netwerk van huwelijksallianties.

Perkin poogt in The social causes of the British Industrial Revolution p. De onmiddellijke oorzaken liggen op het technologisch vlak stoom-machine, drukpers , op het geografische insulaire positie was gunstig voor intensieve wereldhandel , op het politieke non-interventie van de Staat in de economie vanaf op het religieuze dynamisme van Methodistische en Dissen ter-ondernemers. De bezittende klasse was echter niet samengesteld uit inactieve feodale heren zoals op het continent, ze was dynamisch en ondernemend. Het open karakter liet aan de talentrijksten uit de middenklasse de kans om op te klimmen, wat de sociale en politieke frustraties uitschakelde, die in Frankrijk, waar sociale opklimming gefrustreerd was, een politieke revolutie meebracht, waaraan Engeland ontsnapte.

Humphreys stelt in Anglo-American rivalries in Central America p. De Britse diplomaat Chatfield, in funktie in Guatemala van tot , voerde een aktieve politiek tot expansie van de Britse invloed in Centraal- Amerika. Vanaf het einde der jaren kreeg hij af te rekenen met felle concurrentie der V.

Fais-le toi-même!

In april sloten de V. Het eindresultaat van het machtscon- flict was dat Engeland slechts Belize met omgeving behield en er in de kolonie van Brits Honduras mee oprichtte. Het honderdjarig bestaan van de Royal Historical Society, gesticht in , was aanleiding voor de vereniging om een bibliografisch overzicht van haar aktiviteiten te bezorgen A.

  • LÉternel Adam (Illustré) (French Edition).
  • Logan Campbells Auckland: Tales from the Early Years.
  • Editorial WOMEN S FORUM n 1.

Soc, Gower Street, W. Deze bundel geeft de inhoudsopgave van de jaarlijkse Transactions van de R. Verder bevat het ook een overzicht van de in gestarte reeksen van de vroegere Camden Society, nl. Uitvoerige indices maken de bundel uiterst consulteerbaar ; ze bevatten de namen der auteurs en uitgevers, doch ook personen, plaatsen en onderwerpen die voorkomen in de titels der artikels en werken. La plus importante, tant par son ampleur p.

Des tableaux statistiques permettent de mesurer les divers facteurs de ce redressement. Sa documentation repose surtout sur des sources juridiques. Celle de M. Avec Atlantis p. Van Woerden p. Par ailleurs, Z. Dittrich s'efforce d'analyser la nature interne du Fascisme p. Il rapproche beaucoup trop fascisme et. Groen van Prinsterer, R. Bakhuizen van den Brink, R. Fruin, John Motley, W. Nuyens, J. Van Vloten et C. Busken Huet. Hardenberg p. Prijs : F. Deze waardering kan terzelfdertijd de basis zijn voor de meest fundamentele opmerking over het boek.

Het bevat inderdaad bijna uitsluitend een commentaar op wetten, besluiten en circulaires betreffende archieven blz. De titel van het werk zou dan ook in die zin moeten gewijzigd worden. Want zelfs indien na een hoofdstuk Algemeenheden, achtereenvolgens o. Wij schrijven gebrekkig omdat de indeling van de auteur een plaats laat voor de archieven van de ministeries, die soms — zoals Buitenlandse Zaken — een eigen archief en eigen archivaris hebben.

Waarom wordt dan het provinciaal archief wel opgenomen? Waarom wordt het notariaatsarchief behandeld en niet dat van de rechtbanken, de registratie, de hypo- theekbewaring? Waarom wordt gehandeld over het archief van de Kerkfabrieken en niet over het archief van de Bisdommen? De vraag rijst of het bijvoorbeeld mogelijk zou zijn een studie over het Bankwezen te ondernemen enkel op basis van wetten en besluiten, zonder zich met de bankverrichtingen e. Formuleren wij nog enkele detailopmerkingen.

Verder blijkt dat de auteur historisch onvoldoende beslagen is, hoewel hij zich niet zo vaak aan historische beschouwingen waagt. Zo wordt op blz. Op blz. Waar over de organisatie van het Rijksarchief, de reglementen van inwendige orde en het organiek kader van het personeel wordt gesproken blz. Staatsblad van Het stoort te vernemen dat de inventarissen worden gecontroleerd blz. Het is verder niet duidelijk waarom de hulpdepots — die ook dienst doen als arron- dissementsdepot van het ressort — Beveren-Waas en Saint-Hubert, niet worden gesignaleerd samen met de overige rijksarchiefdepots op blz.

De auteur mag het als een verdienste aanrekenen door een duidelijke uiteenzetting te laten blijken, hoe onduidelijk, verwarrend of zelfs tegenstrijdig de teksten nopens het archief, zijn eigendom voor sommige bijzondere gevallen en zijn openbaarheid vaak. Hoewel, zoals reeds gezegd, de titel Archiefwezen o. Voor deze personeelsleden zal het bijzonder verheugend zijn dat de administratief beslagen auteur herhaaldelijk zijn waardering en vertrouwen laat blijken voor de instelling, waarvan zij de agenten zijn blz.

Ten slotte moet nog vermeld worden dat de auteur een volledig hoofdstuk wijdt aan de Nederlandse Archiefwet van , die op 1 mei in werking trad. De vergelijking tussen de Belgische en de Nederlandse wetgeving is bijzonder interessant en valt zeker niet ten nadele van onze Noorderburen uit. Toch is in het Nederlands Rijksarchief, dat — bij voorbeeld voor wat de personeelsbezetting betreft met het onze kan vergeleken worden — een hele deining ontstaan.

In kwam van tussen ongeklasseerde Staten van Goed op het Kortrijkse Stadsarchief een map te voorschijn van ca. Zijn naam is vooral verbonden met de catalogus der handschriften van de Brugse stadsbibliotheek. Waar deze dokumenten, die zich ruwweg in vijf groepjes laten onderverdelen nl.

Dit is biezonder verheugend omdat er voor het gebied, dat nu Pas-de-Calais omvat, relatief weinig originelen bewaard zijn. Niet alle dokumenten zijn echter onbekend, zo bv. Bertin naar afschriften werden uitgegeven. Zoals te verwachten is van een doorwinterd archivaris als Dr. Warlop, steken de samenvattingen degelijk in mekaar : E. Merken we echter op dat Soncamp niet als klooster ontl. XI, Jean Hoyoux p. Thans is het Michel Rouche, assistent aan de Sorbonne, die gezorgd heeft voor de nodige aanvulling i.

Prix de souscription: 24 DM. Prix : lires. Sans doute se demande-t-on parfois s'il.

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Il faut en arriver au Nachwort des p. Bref, M. Walther Bulst pour Marbode ; de M. Strecker, les P. Lehmann, les Otto Schumann, ou par M. Konstanzer Arbeitskreis fur mittelalterliche Geschichte, geleitet v. Mayer, Band XII. Prijs : 48 DM. Kroeschell over Recht und Rechtsbegriff im Jahrhundert zonder dat in deze keuze enig waardeoordeel begrepen is. Eerstgenoemde bijdrage, die aansluit bij de welbekende studies van de auteur, verschenen in Welt als Geschichte, gaat uit van de constatatie dat de Franse IIe eeuw de eeuw van de territoriale vorsten. Voor zijn studie maakt de auteur gebruik van zijn verzameling van oorkonden van de graven van Blois en Champagne.

Het artikel munt uit door zijn zakelijke toon en doordachte constructie, het is echter ook rijk aan anecdoten die soms meer typerend zijn dan omvangrijke analyses. Zie bijv. Terecht noemt de auteur de 1 e kruistocht ab vorstelijke en niet koninklijke onderneming de laatste grote manifestatie van deze vorsten-periode in de Franse geschiedenis.

De studie van Kroeschell is sterk terminologisch getint. De auteur spant zich in om de preciese inhoud te achterhalen van termen als ius, ius Francorum, ius hollandicum, ius ne- gotiatorum, iudicium, iustitia, lex, consuetudo, mos, mos legis, legislator, legis peritus, lex et consuetudo en hun oudhoogduitse equivalenten, die in de 12 e eeuw gebruikelijk waren en een zeer wisselende realiteit konden dekken. Daarnaast treedt het koninklijke gezag op door de verlening van privileges aan afzonderlijke personen of gemeenschappen. De studie van Kroeschell heeft een sterke taalkundige inslag en dankt o.

Sous la direction de MM. Samaran et R. Les Pays-Bas ont suivi et Mr. Masai, M. Unterkircher, Die datierten Handschriften der Oesterreichischen Nationalbibliothek bis zum Jahre Ie Teil: Text. Teil: Tafeln Vienne, ; gd. Oester- reichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Un volume de planches accompagne le volume de texte. Aan onze oproep van om na de Luikse, de Naamse en de Brabantse adel ook die van andere vorstendommen te bestuderen werd geen gevolg gegeven. Warlop heeft dat wel gedaan en nog wel voor een der belangrijkste gewesten. De auteur heeft zich doorheen deze massa geworsteld en ons een zeer verantwoord en helder betoog bezorgd.

De Noord-Franse historicus P. Op de eerste vraag antwoordt Dr. Warlop bevestigend, maar hij waagt zich niet zover als zijn voorganger: de voorouders van de 13de-eeuwse nobiles waren beslist de vin illustres uit de 9e ; het bronnenmateriaal is ontoereikend om bewijzen te leveren betreffende de voorgaande periode. Want die hoedanigheid had men automatisch :.

In dit nieuwe fenomeen heeft de auteur een reden gevonden om zijn studie in af te sluiten. Dat is o. Omdat zolang men ons het vervolg niet geeft de vergelijking met de evolutie in andere vorstendommen bemoeilijkt wordt. Niet overal heeft men even lang aan strakke regels vastgehouden. Om deze reden verwachtten wij een laatste hoofdstuk met een doorsnede van de adelstand oude en nieuwe in de 14e eeuw.

In de plaats daarvan heeft de auteur de voorkeur gegeven aan werk in de diepte binnen zijn periode, eerst tot in dan tot het einde der 13e eeuw :. De lokale ambten werden slechts voor de helft, de hogere uitsluitend door nobiles bezet. Aan de zuivering en de reorganisatie die hiermee gepaard gingen besteedt de auteur een omvangrijk hoofdstuk p. Praktisch ruimde de adel de plaats voor een nieuw ambtenarenkader, met uitzondering van enkele zuivere ercfuncties waaraan nog wel inkomsten doch geen diensten meer verbonden waren.

De edelen gingen niet alleen achteruit op het gebied der instellingen. De auteur heeft het bezwaar dat wij destijds tegen Genicots ekwatie nobiles — liber opperden, nl. Hij stelt vast dat zich inderdaad sedert de tweede helft van de 12de eeuw een voor de edelen ongunstige nivellering aftekent. Ook de sociale en geldelijke status van hun klasse nam af. Zij verarmde terwijl de handel- drijvende stedelingen zich verrijkten.

Op militair gebied stond ze er al niet beter voor : niet-edele milites kwamen op gelijke hoogte en de stedelijke milities overvleugelden meer en meer de ridderlegers.

Dit begrip omvat een sociaal aspect het afsluiten van de stand en een intellectueel aspect gebrek aan vorming , nauw verbonden met een voorbijgestreefde levenswijze die met de evolutie van de economische structuren geen rekening hield. Prachtig werk : niet louter beschrijvende maar echt verklarende geschiedenis!

Het berust op echt Benedictijnerwerk — daarvan getuigen de twee banden bijlagen — maar het is er niet bij gebleven. Moge de auteur de moed opbrengen om ons het vervolg te bezorgen. L'ouvrage est de M. L'ouvrage se termine par un index des noms de personnes et de lieux ainsi que par quelques illustrations. Dans ses conclusions M. C'est vrai sur le plan de la technique et de l'organisation.

Cependant, p. Il est dommage que PA. Uccle, p. Les contradictions existant entre la liste de L. C'est vraisemblablement celui auquel L. En fait, Madame Graffart ne constate pas, dans notre ouvrage, des contradictions avec d'autres listes de juridictions sca- binales, mais bien des lacunes, d'ailleurs volontaires.

VIII, , p. Uccle, U. XLIII, , p. Hij voegt hier jammer genoeg geen duidelijk leesbaar stadsplan aan toe. De 15e-eeuwse te Leuven gebruikte mobiele muntstempel, afgebeeld op pi. XIX is wel de meest bij de materie passende illustratie, samen met pi. Dit kan echter niet worden gezegd van een 18e-eeuwse gravure waarop Lambrecht met de Baard, graaf van Leuven, wordt afgebeeld pi. II en evenmin van een te klein fascsimile van het Charter van Kortenberg pi. VII , van de wapenschilden der Zeven Geslachten pi. X en de folkloristiche groep smeden in de kermisprocessie pi.

Het mooie papier dat daaraan nutteloos werd verspild kon dienen voor meer foto's van munten. Wat de tekst betreft beperken wij ons tot volgende opmerkingen. Waar het gaat over de verklaring van beeldenaars en opschriften van de 13e-eeuwse penningen, houdt de auteur geen rekening met de door ons geopperde bezwaren tegen de stelling van De Witte cf. CV, , p. Het feit dat alleen de diameter en niet het gewicht wordt vermeld is evenmin verantwoord.

De in bijlage afgedrukte teksten werden ontleend aan oude uitgaven ; soms wordt de herkomst ervan niet eens vermeld. Wij zijn niet gekant tegen de modern opgevatte bladspiegel, maar wij verkiezen de noten onderaan op de bladzijde en niet achteraan in het boek te zien. Samenvattend kan men zeggen : geen wetenschappelijk, maar vulgariserend werk geschreven in een duidelijke en vrij keurige taal. Toch vinden wij het jammer dat dhr. Crab ons niet een kataloog van de te Leuven bewaarde muntstukken bezorgde of een echt wetenschappelijke monografie die de plaats van De Witte's hoofdstukken over Leuven kon innemen.

Hij zou de Vlaamse cultuur en de numismatische wetenschap een grotere dienst hebben bewezen. Langeton, tesaurier van Edward I. Dezelfde auteur heeft nu in dit nieuwe volume van de. Camden Society de bronnen uitgegeven, waarop ze vnl. Camden fourth series, vol. Het grootste deel van de verzorgde uitgave bevat de tekst van schuldbekentenissen aan het adres van de bisschop, maar na zijn aanhouding overgenomen door de koning.

Het andere deel bevat de verklaringen en klachten tegen de bisschop, en zijn zoniet overwegend, dan toch voor een groot deel in het frans gesteld. Men zal dus uiteindelijk komen tot veertig boeken waarvan er dus twintig aan belangrijke historische figuren zullen zijn gewijd. Men heeft voor de levensbeschrijving van Karel V beroep gedaan op de bekende Spaanse auteur Salvador de Madariaga, die zich goed van zijn taak heeft gekweten.

In een kleine honderd bladzijden heeft deze veelzijdige auteur een boeiend levensrelaas van zijn held neergeschreven zie p. Deze biografie is voorafgegaan door een zeer nuttige inleiding, waarbij de territoriale en sociale struktuur van de zestiende eeuw bondig wordt geschetst. Prix : F. A vrai dire, si M. Naar men uit het voorwoord kan opmaken, zal door deze tragische verdwijning dit reuzewerk waarschijnlijk onvoltooid blijven. Mogelijk zal nog posthuum het drukklare deel III, 1 over de jaren tot het licht kunnen zien, maar het slotstuk over de jaren en vooral de zo noodzakelijke samenvatting en synthese van het voor de buitenstaander haast onoverzienbaar geheel zullen ons op deze wijze ontroofd worden.

Band 11 — Studien zur Fuggergeschichte, Band Prijs : 70 DM. Opvatting en uitwerking van dit deel zijn volledig gelijk aan de voorafgaande banden, die wij hier reeds voorstelden in dl. XLI , blz. XLIII , blz. Uiteraard nemen Antwerpen en de daar bedrijvige bankiers en firma's als G.

Ducci, G. Affaitadi en de Schetsen een voorname plaats in. Vermeldingen van Erasmus en andere humanisten en kunstenaars zijn legio. Zelfs onooglijke details met betrekking tot een aantal Zuidnederlandse steden werden niet versmaad. Misschien nog meer dan aan de vorige delen, zullen de economische historici hebben aan de derde band. Talrijke uitvoerige passages hebben. Belangrijkst wellicht is de analyse van de door R. Ehrenberg verloren gewaande algemene inventaris en rekeningsbalans van de firma d. De activa bedroegen 7. Dit bracht het kapitaalbezit dus op 5. De factorie van Spanje en deze van Antwerpen met respectievelijk 2.

Vergeleken met de inventaris van , door J. Strieder uitgegeven, en met het inlegkapitaal van was de aangroei fenomenaal. De in vooruitzicht gestelde publicatie van de algemene balans van werd op al te pijnlijke wijze stilgelegd Van Uytven. Haak dl. I kon bezorgen en duurde het zelfs nog 28 jaren vooraleer in dl. II verscheen. Maar zoals de nieuwe bewerker, Dr. Veenendaal, toen verzekerde, was het derde, tevens laatste deel op komst.

Dank zij zijn doorzettende werkkracht raakte thans inderdaad de onderneming voltooid met het verschijnen van : Johan van Oldenbarnevelt. Bescheiden betreffende zijn staatkundig beleid en zijn familie Derde deel, , uitgegeven door Dr. Prijs: 40 f. Heel speciaal kan hier b. Buiten de bescheiden, waarvan de meeste in extenso worden gepubliceerd, uit de laatste jaren van de landsadvokaat vinden we in dit deel nog een Supplement met nummers uit de jaren , en zelfs in de Addenda et Corrigenda achteraan nog een zevental zeer laat op het spoor gekomen stukken.

Bevatten een zeker aantal van de hier gepubliceerde of vermelde bescheiden heel wat gegevens over Oldenbamevelts partikuliere aangelegenheden en over het eko- nomische en sociale leven, de meeste hebben vanzelfsprekend betrekking op de kerkelijke moeilijkheden binnen de Republiek en op de politieke gebeurtenissen in binnen- en buitenland. In dat laatste opzicht kan vooral gewezen worden op de uitgebreide briefwisseling met Caron te Londen en met G. De beoefenaars van de zeventiende-eeuwse geschiedenis zullen de bewerker dankbaar zijn voor de snelle en degelijke afwerking van deze belangrijke bronnenuitgave en voor de nauwkeurige annotatie.

Maar menigeen zal hem nog bijzonder erkentelijk zijn voor de verdienstelijke poging tot oplossing van de twee geheimschrift-codes die vooral in de briefwisseling met Van Boetzelaer worden aangetroffen. De resultaten van die ver-. Waters, The Rutters of the Sea. The sailing directions of Pierre Garcie. Prix : 25 dol. Zijn latere werkzaamheden en gezondheidstoestand hebben echter de uitvoering op de lange baan geschoven zodat hij ten slotte de hoop op publikatie had opgegeven.

Na Evennetts dood hebben vrienden en kollega's het wenselijk geacht voor een postume uitgave te zorgen : H. Outram Evennett, The spirit of the Counter-Reformation. Edited with a postscript by John Bossy. Prijs : 35s. Ze wensten ook vooral in boekvorm de resultaten vast te leggen van een twintigjarige navorsingsarbeid op een gebied en betreffende een onderwerp dat in de Engelse historiografie nog al te veronachtzaamd was gebleven.

Als geen ander Engels historicus was Evennett inderdaad met de diepe inhoud en bete-. Hij bleef niet staan bij de konventionele en al te eenzijdige voorstelling die de term in de Engelse historiografie opriep. Een van Evennetts oud-studenten, Dr. Bossy, thans verbonden aan de universiteit van Belfast, werd bereid gevonden de tekst van het handschrift voor publikatie persklaar te maken. Hij voorzag hem, met behulp van Evennetts fragmentarische aantekeningen, van de nodige verklarende voetnoten en literatuurverwijzingen en voegde er een slothoofdstuk aan toe, waarin hij, aan de hand van recente studies, op enkele kwesties nader ingaat : de ontwikkeling in Ignatius' spiritualiteit, de betekenis van het koncilie van Trente, de oorzaken voor het latere verval in de Contra-Reformatie.

Intussen blijven echter ook Evennetts eigen beschouwingen, na bijna 20 jaren, hun volle waarde behouden en kunnen ook niet-Engelse lezers hun voordeel doen met zijn inzicht en synthese. Jadis le monopole plus ou moins intact du commerce colonial garantissait la richesse de Seville. Kellenbenz, J. Lapeyre, A. Dominguez Ortiz, J. Aanvankelijk waren ze vooral belast met de verdediging van het stedelijk grondgebied.

Later evolueerden ze tot burgerwachten of nachtwachten die instonden voor de handhaving van de goede orde. Vrij spoedig stelden de stedelijke autoriteiten beroepssoldaten aan en vervingen de dienstplicht door een belasting. Deze belasting werd meestal op de woonsten geheven en was dikwijls erg onpopulair temeer daar de stedelingen niet altijd van het nut van een korps stadssoldaten overtuigd waren. Wij missen echter een gedeelte gewijd aan het optreden van de stadssoldaten. Werden ze ingeschakeld om sociale en andere relletjes de kop in te drukken?

De auteur die de korpsen vooral ziet in het kader van de stadsinstellingen verzwijgt het ons. Burton, P. Riley et E. Prix : 20s. Les listes dont il est fait usage ici sont au nombre de trois. Seul A. Tome I, Une source d'histoire sociale. Guide des recherches s. C, ne permet pas de chiffrer les pertes par combats. Prix : 20 fr.

Empereur ou roi, ce monarque serait issu du sang de France, celui des Capet. Dans cette perspective, l'A. Prijs : 95 FF. Het lijvige en minutieuze werk steunt hoofdzakelijk op overzeese archiefbronnen, overwegend van administratieve en diplomatieke aard. Een socio-economische schets van de beide verwante negerkolonies slaven in Bahia, gerepatrieerden in Benin vervolledigt onderhavig onderzoek.

De auteur last voortdurend en in een enigszins overdadige mate bronnencitaten in, soms ten nadele van de interpretatie ; dit euvel wordt evenwel gecompenseerd door een vlotte leesbaarheid en de streng-logische opbouw zijner studie. The Canadian Centenary Series. Prix : 60 d. Surtout, la fondation de la Compagnie du Nord-Ouest,. Pour en finir, le gouvernement de Londres, en , favorise activement la fusion des deux Compagnies.

Pendant longtemps les. Prijs s. Daardoor is het een mengeling geworden van geschiedenis, analyse van politieke sociale en economische structuren, en hier en daar zelfs toeristische tips. Grosso modo is de auteur wel in zijn opzet geslaagd. In de eerste hoofdstukken geeft F. Zeer geslaagd is het beeld dat hij ophangt aan de Belgische revolutie van , en van de rol van Leopold I in deze jonge staat.

Terecht merkt hij hierbij op p. De ontleding zelf van deze strijd is echter niet steeds systematisch uitgewerkt. Sommige passages zijn zeer raak geschetst, andere zijn uitermate vaag en onvolledig bijvoorbeeld de periode tussen beide wereldoorlogen.